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 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. University of Hawai'i Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophy East and West. http://www.jstor.org BOOK REVIEWS Boston Confucianism: Portable Tradition in the Late-Modern World. By Robert Cummings Neville. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000. Pp. xxxv + 258. Reviewed by Bryan W. Van Norden Vassar College At an international conference in 1991, people began to refer to Robert Neville and his colleagues as "Boston Confucians." At first the phrase was used as affectionate teasing and tongue-in-cheek self-description. However, Neville reports that, by the end of the conference, the phrase "Boston Confucianism" had come to be used as a semi-serious label for a particular view: the position that "Confucianism is not limited to East Asian ethnic application" and that it "has something genuinely interesting and helpful to bring to contemporary philosophical discussions" (p. 1). Neville's book, Boston Confucianism: Portable Tradition in the Late-Modern World, is a defense of these claims. In the process of defending his theses, Neville makes a number of points that I think are utterly incontrovertible. Ishall note five of his insights. The first three I shall just mention, but then I shall proceed to two that are particularly worthy of more extensive discussion. First, one need not be ethnically East Asian to be a Confucian. To deny this claim is as absurd as suggesting that one must be Greek in order to be a Platonist or an Aristotelian (p. xxii). Second, in order to be a viable, contemporary "world philosophy," Confucianism must have (and has yet to develop) ways to accommodate cultural diversity and pluralism in practice. Third, Confucianism must show that it is not inconsistent with the insights of modern science. (This is particularly an issue if, like Neville, one is attracted to the more metaphysically baroque forms of Confucianism that developed in the Song and later dynasties.) Neville's fourth insight is that the Confucian notion of "ritual" is a category that could significantly deepen and broaden Western philosophical discussions. Neville suggests that the semiotic work of the American pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce provides a useful framework for understanding and enriching the Confucian emphasis on ritual. Neville's comments on Peirce are suggestive, but I wonder what Neville would say about the "functionalist" approach to ritual pioneered by Emile Durkheim. Durkheim argued, in works such as The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, that participation in ritual activities functions to express and (more importantly) maintain the individual's commitment to society.1 Several commentators, including A. R. Radcliffe-Brown (who independently developed an approach to ritual similar to that of Durkheim) and more recently Robert F. Campany, have noted that this sort of functionalist interpretation of ritual is quite similar to that advanced by Xunzi more than 2,500 years ago.2 Functionalism helps us to understand (in naturalistic terms) why ritual is so important, why it is perfectly acceptable for it to take different forms in different societies, and why the decay of ritual leads to excessive individualism and, in Durkheim's phrase, "anomie." As far as I can see, all of this is at least conPhilosophy East & West Volume 53, Number 3 July 2003 413-417 413 ? 2003 by University of Hawai'i Press sistent with what Neville says about ritual, but I would be interested to know whether he thinks functionalism adds anything to a Peircean construal of Confucian ritual. Finally, Neville presents an insightful critique of the positions developed by David Hall and Roger Ames in their trilogy of books.3 It is worth spending some time on Neville's critique, since Roger Ames and the late David Hall are so well known and have been such influential figures in contemporary comparative thought. Neville objects that "their method of contrasting cultures by generalizing to basic principles and trivializing exceptions follows the Western ... strategy of developing a grid of categories ... and locating thinkers and cultures within them.... This is surely an imposition of categories from without to the neglect of the concrete, a matter they ironically would consign to the West" (p. 49). Another way of putting this point is that Hall and Ames strongly oppose what they see as the dualistic tendencies in the Western tradition, and applaud the nondualistic tendencies in the Chinese tradition. However, they do so using a sort of "methodological dualism," which sharply distinguishes "China" and "the West," as if each were itself largely monolithic. Hall and Ames certainly do acknowledge that there are exceptions to their generalizations. But, as Neville suggests, there is much more complexity and subtlety in both "China" and "the West" than methodological dualism allows. Neville makes a related objection to Hall and Ames' application of the notion of "transcendence" to distinguish Chinese and Western thought (pp. 148-150). Hall and Ames write: "a principle, A, is transcendent with respect to that, B, which it serves as principle if the meaning or import of B cannot be fully analyzed and explained without recourse to A, but the reverse is not true."4 However, as Neville notes, "heaven, earth, and dao are all transcendent in the strict sense" (p. 149), even following Hall and Ames' definition of that term. Consider, as an illustration, the discussion of the dao in Daodejing chapter 25: There is a thing confused yet perfect, which arose before Heaven and earth. Still and indistinct, it stands alone and unchanging. It goes everywhere yet is never at a loss. One can regard it as the mother of Heaven and earth. People model themselves on the earth. The earth models itself on Heaven. Heaven models itself on the Way. The Way models itself on what is natural.5 The dao certainly seems to be described as transcendent in this passage. Neville also observes that Hall and Ames' own definition of transcendence actually does not apply to many of the Western concepts that they use to illustrate it. I agree with this point, but I am unsure about Neville's way of arguing for it. He says of Hall and Ames that "in all their examples-God, a Platonic form, the unmoved mover, a classical atom, a decisive will-the transcendent principle cannot be explained in itself, only in its explanatory function" (p. 150). Neville's argument seems to be that A cannot transcend B if A cannot be explained to us humans with414 Philosophy East & West out reference to B. I am not sure that this follows from Hall and Ames' definition. But part of the problem here is that it is not clear what Hall and Ames mean by "the meaning or import" of something. Do atoms (as conceived by, say, Lucretius) transcend ordinary physical objects? Hall and Ames state explicitly that they do,6 but it is hard to know how to apply their characterization of transcendence to this case, because "meaning" and "import" are not central concepts in classical atomist philosophical views or methodology. Leaving tricky cases like this aside, though, I agree with Neville that there are many major Western philosophical movements that it would be misleading to describe as "transcendent." Aristotle, for example, suggests in Metaphysics Z that the "primary substances" are ordinary, everyday physical objects, whose matter, form, function, and "efficient cause" all interrelate to make them what they are. So I find myself pleasantly in agreement with Neville on a number of important points. In fact, I have only two disagreements worth mentioning. One is that, precisely because I agreed with so many of this book's major theses, I wondered whether it actually advances the argument in the field in an important way. Are we being told anything we didn't already know? (When I was in graduate school, we used the phrase "New Wave Confucianism" to describe the same basic position that Neville identifies with "Boston Confucianism." So Neville's label is original, but the concept is not.) However, perhaps the points this book makes are controversial to more of the major figures in the field than I realize. This relates to my second difference of opinion with Neville, which has to do with how the two of us conceptualize the field of Chinese and comparative philosophy as a whole. I was surprised, for example, by how much space and energy this book devotes to the views of Tu Wei-ming. My own view is that Tu occupies a position in contemporary Confucianism roughly equivalent to that of a serious, sincere Christian evangelist, one who is charming in personal presence and delightful and effective as a public speaker, but not a Biblical exegete, theologian, or historian of religion, and not regarded as such by those who are. Neville is aware of the concern that certain versions of Confucianism may seem "bland" (p. 84). He strives valiantly to make something sophisticated and "piquant" out of Tu's comparison of Confucianism and Kierkegaardian existentialism (pp. 86ff.). However, I ended up thinking that the similarities are not illuminating of either Kierkegaard or Confucianism . Tu's main point seems to be that, according to both Kierkegaard and Confucianism , living well requires an intense personal commitment to the source of value (God or the dao, respectively). But this is a very thin similarity. For example, Aristotle is neither an existentialist nor a Confucian, but he, too, stresses that one must "choose" virtue for its own sake. Perhaps my objection will be more clear if I say a little about what I consider to be a more helpful comparison of Confucianism and existentialism. In his "Moral Decision in Wang Yang-ming: The Problem of Chinese 'Existentialism,'" David S. Nivison points out that there are superficial similarities between the two positions: "there is much curiously existentialist-like talk about 'freedom' and 'nothingness' between Wang Yang-ming and his students."7 However, "'Nothing' for Wang's Book Reviews 415 disciples seems to mean an absence of preconception or selfish interest that could attach or bind us to things. For Western existentialists, consciousness is 'nothing' because it must be other than its object, which 'is': while the object so to speak just sits there, a thing 'in itself,' we are things 'for ourselves,' as it were, tipped into the world, concerned with open possibilities of dealing with it. One could argue that this is the direct opposite of 'nothing' as 'nonattachment.'"8 Furthermore, for Wang and his disciples, "freedom is spontaneity and is something they take for granted that we want to have; indeed the task of self-cultivation is to adjust our understanding of ourselves so that 'obstructions' to spontaneity, all anxiety or hesitation, fall away. For both Kierkegaard and Sartre our freedom is a terrifying burden, its exercise painful, something we can never really escape, though we will hide it from ourselves if we can."9 Perhaps the most important difference is that "Wang seems to be in the last analysis an 'intellectualist,' not a 'voluntarist' in ethics." In other words, Wang thought that there was some objective truth to discover within ourselves, and that this can and should be our ethical guide.10 For existentialists of either the theistic or atheistic variety, the claim to follow such an inner guide would be a paradigmatic instance of "bad faith." Nivison has certainly not given us the last word on this topic.11 But what I find preferable in a discussion like Nivison's is that it clearly sets out various positions, shows intimate familiarity with both the relevant Western and Chinese philosophical texts, takes into account historical context and the development of intellectual traditions over time, and then tries to identify specific similarities and differences. The failure to do this kind of careful work is, I believe, one of the reasons that Tu Weiming 's work has had little influence in the broader philosophical community. Perhaps , though, like Zhuangzi's well-frog, I have insufficient appreciation of what lies outside my own narrow perspective. Allow me to end on an irenic note. Let us heartily agree with Neville that Confucianism is in no way parochial to East Asia. And let us also agree that the various alternative formulations of Confucianism are in a league with the various formulations of Platonism, Aristotelianism, Kantianism, Vedanta, Buddhism, and others as participants in a world-philosophical dialogue. Notes 1 Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, trans. Karen E. Fields (New York: Free Press, 1995). See especially the sections "Definition of Religious Phenomena and of Religion" and "Conclusion." 2 See A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, "Religion and Society," in Brown, Structure and Function in Primitive Society: Essays and Addresses (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1952), pp. 153-177; Robert F. Campany, "Xunzi and Durkheim as Theorists of Ritual Practice ," in Frank Reynolds and David Tracy, Discourse and Practice (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), pp. 197-231; and Xunzi, "Discourse on Heaven," "Discourse on Ritual," and "Discourse on Music," trans. Eric Hutton, in Philip J. Ivan416 Philosophy East & West hoe and Bryan W. Van Norden, eds., Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy (New York: Seven Bridges Press, 2001), pp. 260-272. 3 The books to which Neville refers are David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, Thinking through Confucius (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987); idem, Anticipating China (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995); and idem, Thinking from the Han: Self, Truth, and Transcendence in Chinese and Western Culture (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998). For an alternative critique of their approach, see Stephen A. Wilson, "Conformity, Individuality, and the Nature of Virtue," in Bryan W. Van Norden, ed., Confucius and the Analects: New Essays (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 94-115. 4 Hall and Ames, Thinking through Confucius, p. 13. This statement immediately raises one minor issue that Neville does not address. Formally speaking, what Hall and Ames have given is a sufficient condition for something being transcendent. Sufficient conditions are of the logical form "P, if Q." One suspects that Hall and Ames meant to give necessary and sufficient conditions, which would be of the form "P if and only if Q." 5 Ivanhoe and Van Norden, Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy, p. 171. 6 Hall and Ames, Thinking through Confucius, p. 13. 7David S. Nivison, "Moral Decision in Wang Yang-ming: The Problem of Chinese 'Existentialism,"' in David S. Nivison, The Ways of Confucianism (Chicago: Open Court Press, 1996), p. 235 (originally published in Philosophy East and West 23 [1-2] [January-April 1973]: 121-137. All references in this review are to the reprinted version . Note that Nivison's essay was published several years prior to Tu Wei-ming's work on this topic). 8 Nivison, "Moral Decision in Wang Yang-ming," p. 236. 9Ibid. 10 On this point, see David S. Nivison, "The Philosophy of Wang Yang-ming," in Nivison, The Ways of Confucianism, pp. 217-231. 11 One of Nivison's students has addressed this issue in even more detail: Philip J. Ivanhoe, "'Existentialism' in the School of Wang Yangming," in Ivanhoe, Chinese Language, Thought, and Culture (Chicago: Open Court Press, 1996), pp. 250-264. Response to Bryan W. Van Norden's Review of Boston Confucianism Robert Cummings Neville Boston University Professor Van Norden's gracious claim that much of my point in Boston Confucianism was already known and accepted in his graduate school somehow makes me feel the way the Chinese emperor must have felt when he stood in the doorway looking south and the empire just fell into order. Whew! Philosophy East & West Volume 53, Number 3 July 2003 417-420 417 ? 2003 by University of Hawai'i Press